

think we should apply these criteria. In the Sinai, America saw the confluence of vital national security interests, a strong probability of success emerging from a peace accord initiated and completed by Egypt and Israel, and a conflict where two of our close allies requested our involvement. The Middle East conflicts of the last 50 years have repeatedly placed the United States at odds with the Arab world. The threats to the vital energy supplies of the West's industrial base threatened our most significant national interests. Indeed, the world-wide economic recessions of the late 1970's and early 1990's are both directly attributable to the oil shocks of 1973 and 1990.

The threats to our national security alone were sufficient to warrant our involvement. But, in this case, the criteria of our international relations with the involved countries was also met through our ties with Egypt and Israel. The Camp David Accord was a consummation of a growing United States-Egyptian relationship, heralding a breakthrough in United States-Arab relations. Started with the shuttle diplomacy of Henry Kissinger, and culminating in the extensive military-to-military relationship developing through our assistance programs, the deployment of American troops to the Sinai helped cement our emerging relationship with Egypt. Furthermore, our commitment to Israeli sovereignty and security has always been a cornerstone of United States Middle East policy. Our participation in the Sinai multinational observer force directly improved our relationship with both countries, helped stabilize the Middle East, and directly represented our commitment to the success of the Camp David Accords. It is doubtful our close relations with either country, the successful establishment of Palestinian authority, or the Israeli-Jordanian Peace Agreement, would have been possible without our peacekeeping pledge.

Finally, the probability of success for the Camp David Accord was particularly high given that the combatant states themselves initiated the process and had the most to lose by its failure. It was apparent from the start that both Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin wanted peace, but needed assistance in finding a way to protect their vital national security interests. In such a situation, the good offices provided by the United States, and the assurances to Israeli security provided by the presence of our troops, were the critical elements in securing the Accord.

The Dayton agreement, on the other hand, in my view represents a situation in which an American peacekeeping presence is not justified. As I stated during the authorization debate, there is a American interest in resolving the Balkan conflict arising from the threat of broader European instability, the strain the conflict places on our relationships with our NATO allies, and the friction it causes between Eastern and Western Europe. But none of these

threats is so far along the scale of national interest that they warrant our involvement in and of their own right. In fact, when measured against the other criteria of success probability and our relationships with the regional states, I believe a compelling case is made for the United States to participate in a peacekeeping mission.

As I just explained, I believe American troops are particularly ill suited to serve as traditional, impeccably neutral peacekeepers. They present too ripe a political target and bring too much political baggage simply because of the flag they fly. Because there are alternatives to United States ground involvement, including the provision of air and naval forces, logistical support, and financial resources to support other nations' forces, I believe it is wiser to use smaller, more traditional peacekeeping forces from areas such as Scandinavia, Africa, and Asia.

Furthermore, I am not convinced the Dayton Accord was anything other than an imposed peace by a paternalistic Clinton administration. Whereas both the Israelis and Egyptians had concluded that further use of arms was fruitless and counterproductive, the Balkan parties, in my opinion, believe force may still be a legitimate tool to achieve their political aims. In fact, the Washington Times of 31 January 1996 quoted a draft version of a new national intelligence estimate as stating, "the former combatants share a deep, mutual distrust and will continue to seek achievement of their fundamental goals, rather than accommodation, even as the Dayton agreement proceeds * * *. They will see compromise as a zero-sum game and attempt to divide and manipulate the international community in the way the accords are implemented." Until all sides truly want peace, I am doubtful that any peace agreement, no matter how elegantly crafted, will hold in the long run. An imposed peace is, to me, only conflict delayed. Once we leave, I believe the conflict will start anew.

Mr. President, I wish we could decide when and where to deploy American troops in support of peacekeeping missions by consulting a checklist of clearly definable and easily quantifiable criteria. Unfortunately, the world is not so simplistic. Each conflict, each situation that begs our involvement, each call for America to serve as policeman or arbiter of justice, presents an enormous range of national security concerns. Along the broad scales of national interests, international relations, and mission success feasibility, we must identify the net result for each situation and determine what action will best advance our national goals. It is not easy, it is not clean, but we must do it. Often times, I believe we will discover that our national interests are not sufficiently implicated to warrant the disproportionate risk under which our military must labor simply because they are the highly visible political force of the world's

only superpower. But at other times, especially when our interests do lie with the protection of one or more parties to a conflict, the deployment of U.S. peacekeepers may reasonably advance our national interests. At times like these, we must be ready and willing to make such a commitment to assisting our friends and allies in achieving true and lasting peace.●

JOSEPH GENTILE

● Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise today to recognize Joseph Gentile from the State of Connecticut. Over the last three decades, Mr. Gentile, who resides in the Morris Cove section of New Haven with his wife, Bernadette, and three children, has truly demonstrated a genuine love for his fellow man. He has devoted himself tirelessly to his community in his quest to help the area youth and underprivileged succeed. Through his participation in sports and community organizations, he has always extended a helping hand and his goodwill to those in need.

His accomplishments, as are the lives that Joseph has touched and help shape, are countless. As a coach, commissioner, administrator, and friend of the Annex Y.M.A. Little League, the East Haven Midget Football League, and East Haven High School he produced winners on and off the field. His football, baseball, and softball teams won numerous league, State, and district championships throughout his coaching career. More importantly, the youngsters he came in contact with learned lessons in humility, sportsmanship, and perseverance from a true role model.

Joseph Gentile has also exemplified these same qualities as a long-standing member and former board of governor and director of the Walter Camp Football Foundation, as a volunteer for the Connecticut Special Olympics and while serving as a New Haven commissioner for persons with disabilities. He has also played an instrumental role while serving as district coordinator for the New Challenger Division in Little League baseball for physically and mentally handicapped children. When called upon for assistance, Joseph Gentile has always answered the call.

Therefore, Mr. President, I see it only fitting that this outstanding and caring individual be commended for his many contributions, hard work and for always having a golden heart.●

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. FAIRCLOTH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.